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INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS LAW:
A PLEA FOR SEGREGATION
ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG*
Mr. Armand Du Bois' article in the Minnesota Law Review'
has, for almost a quarter of a century, remained the only analysis
of the subject of the present article. His opinion, which favored sub-
stantial identity of interstate and international conflicts in this
country, is shared by the Restatement of Conflict of Laws.2 A brief
re-examination of his thesis may be necessary at a time when the
American Law Institute has embarked upon a complete revision of
the Restatement.3 Professor Willis Reese, the reporter for the Re-
statement Second, has expressed the opinion that this new project,
except where its text clearly indicates otherwise, should be read as
referring only to interstate conflicts. 4 This article is written in sup-
port of that view.
The only precedent for this approach is Rorer's Interstate Law
which, eighty years ago, excluded from its scope international trans-
actions as governed by "the doctrine of international law."5 Before
and after this treatise, American courts and writers assumed iden-
tity between the principles governing international and interstate
transactions.
*Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
This paper is an abbreviated version of the author's contribution to the
roundtable discussion on this topic at the 1956 meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools in Chicago. This version will, in substance, be in-
cluded in a text now in preparation.
1. Du Bois, The Significance ot Conflict of Lou's of the Distinction
between Interstate and Intentational Transactions, 17 Minn. L. Rev. 361
(1933).
2. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 2 (1934).
3. Restatement Second, Conflict of Laws, Tent. Draft No. 3 (1956).
4. Professor Reese has kindly authorized me to refer to this opinion
orally expressed at the above roundtable with the proviso that this opinion
is not to be taken as that of his advisers or of the American Law Institute.
5. Rorer, American Inter-State Law 1 (1879). 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws
XXX (1935), denies this book any "independent authority. " For an mti-
mation that from early beginnings the difference between international and
interstate conflicts law has been keenly felt in the civil law state of Louisiana,
see Livermore, Dissertations 137 (1828), concerning the disposition of per-
sonal property under the law of "a sovereign state" as distinguished from an-
other state of the union.
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When Story wrote his Commentaries,u this assumption was
based on at least two facts no longer true. In the first place, a
general commercial and common law largely avoided interstate con-
flicts situations ;7 and those few that arose from a slowly spreading
disruption of this general law were held solvable under a "law of
nations" derived from natural law ideals and continental traditions.'
Secondly, constitutional limitations upon the application of such
ideals and traditions to the solution of interstate conflicts were still
in their infancy, even as to the most obvious object of constitutional
stringency, the recognition of sister state judgments. Instead of
attempting to trace the changes that have since occurred in both re-
spects and their impact upon the relation between international and
6. Story, Conflict of Laws (1834).
7 See in general 1 Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the His-
tory of the United States 549 (1953).
8. Story, Conflict of Laws 9, 10 (1834). According to Du Bois, supro
note 1, this derivation accounts for what he considers the essentially interstate
character of both our international and interstate conflicts law, since he sees
both the Dutch and French sources of this law based on interregional rela-
tions. Du Bois, supra note 1, at 362, 380. As to the recognition of foreignjudgments this analysis is clearly open to challenge. True, in the Netherlands
a decree of 1580 following the Union of Utrecht had provided for mutual
enforcement of judgments by the several provinces, and the Code Michand
of 1629 had given a similar injunction for France. But neither law applied
to the judgments of foreign countries. Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of
American Money Judgments Abroad and What to Do About It, 42 Iowa L.
Rev. 236, 238 (1957) Thus, as to such judgments, it was the Dutch doctrine
of international comity, the French attitude of outright hostility to foreignjudgments [cf. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 210 (1895)] or Lord Mans-
field's aloofness [Walker v. Witter, 1 Doug. 1, 99 Eng. Rep. 1 (K.B. 1778) 1.
rather than interregional affinities, that were the sources of early American
law. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Knight, 1 Mass. 401, 2 Am. Dec. 36 (1805) , Hitch-
cock v. Aicken, 1 Cames 460 1st ed. (N.Y. 1803).
Similarly, as to problems of choice of law, early American law was com-
pletely devoid of interregional influence. Huberus, Story's main source, was
in the first place a Frisian, devoted to "the jealous separatism of seven indi-
vidualistic provinces" [Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International
Law, 2 Am. J. Comp. L. 297, 306 (1953)], and concerned with "the observ-
ance of Frisian laws in other countries," among which he included the laws
of the other provinces [Huber, The Jurisprudence of My Time, vol. 1, p. 11,
see also, e.g., vol. 2, p. 130 (1939)]. And d'Argentre, his great continental
predecessor and counterpart, also relied upon by Du Bois, supra, for ls
interstate thesis, was equally "preoccupied with the defense of the legal
autonomy of his province." Batiffol, Drott International Prive 266 (2d ed.
1955). See also Yntema, supra, at 306, and particularly Gamillseheg, Der
Einfluss Dumoulins auf die Entwicklung des Kollisionsrechts 101 (1955) We
must conclude, therefore, that American conflicts law is international rather
than interregional in its origin, though its later interstate developments may
have contributed significantly to a tightening abroad of private international
law. See also, Nussbaum, Rise aM Decline of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine
ti the Conflict of Laws, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 189 (1942) , Ehrenzweig, American
Conflicts Law si Its Historical Perpective, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 133 (1954)
9. See, e.g., Peck v. Williamson, 19 Fed. Cas. 85 (C.C. N.C. 1813),
Smith v. Lewis, 3 Johns. 157 (N.Y. 1808) , Bartlett v. Knight, 1 Mass. 401(1805) , Phelps v. Holker, 1 DalI. 261 (Pa. 1788) , Jenkins v. Putnam, 1 Bay
8 (S.C. Law 1784) But see ifra note 12.
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interstate conflicts, the following summary analysis will list, as of
today, some of the reasons that may be urged for their separate
treatment, having in mind the need for both an independent inter-
state and an independent international conflicts law. The problems
discussed should be taken as mere examples to illustrate the need
for a comprehensive study of the entire subject of conflict of laws
from the stated viewpoint.
NEED FOR AN INDEPENDENT INTERSTATE CONFLICTS LAW
The near abandonment of international, 0 and lately even of a
national conflicts law, 1 in combination with the great diversity of the
common and statutory laws of the several states, has, in view of the
continuing growth of interstate commerce and migraton, prompted
a demand for ever more definte and uniform interstate conflicts
rules. Even beyond long acknowledged compulsions in the recogni-
10. On the current controversy about a proposed constitutional amend-
ment which would preclude treaties from modifying state conflicts rules, see.
e.g., Perlman, On Amending the Treaty Power, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 825
(1952), 78 Report of N.Y. State Bar Ass'n 281 (1955).
On the desirability on the other hand, of greater initiative of the United
States in this field see, e.g., Nadelmann, The United States and the Hague
Conference on Private International Law, 1 Am. J. Comp. L. 268 (1952),
Nadelmann, Ignored State Interests, etc., 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 323 (1954).
Nadelmann, supra note 8. Possibly, constitutional objections to federal and
executive interference with state rights are the primary cause for hes-
itation. Cf. the line of dicta from it re D'Adamo's Estate, 212 N.Y. 214.
106 N.E. 81, 85 (1914), to Amaya v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 158 F.2d 554
(5th Cir. 1946), cert. dented, 331 U.S. 808 (1947), and saving clauses, such
as -Art. 2 9 9c of the treaty of Versailles, or that contained in the Peace Treaty
with Italy of 1947 (61 Stat. 1367). On a similar attitude to inter-American
efforts for treaty codification, see Kuhn, Opunon of the Inter-American
Juridical Commission on Revision of the Bustamnante Code, 46 Am. J. Int. L.
317 (1952), Lorenzen, The Pan American Code of Private Intentational
Law, 4 Tul. L. Rev. 499, 519 (1930). But see Fenwick, The Charter of the
Organization of American States as the "Law of the Land," 47 Am. J. Int. L.
281 (1953). A possible change of attitude in at least a limited field may be
foreshadowed in the proposal of the U. S. Department of Justice to appoint
a federal commission to study international rules of judicial procedure. Re-
lease March 16, 1955. See in general Jones, Interniational Judicial Assistance:
Procedural Chuaos and a Program for Reform, 62 Yale L.J. 515 (1953).
11. See Cheatham, A Federal Nation and the Conflict of Laws, The Con-
flict of Laws and International Contracts 193 (1949), Cheatham, Federal
Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 581 (1953). United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937), still stands as the only authoritative state-
ment by the Supreme Court promising the development of such a national con-
flicts law, outside the field of admiralty and congressional legislation, Such
rammum national standards of choice of law as may be implied in Home In-
surance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), have found little implementation in
the last quarter of a century. See ifra note 55. Federal conflicts law.,, as ap-
plied by the federal courts, has suffered a fatal blow from the extension of the
Erie doctrine to the field of conflict of laws. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric
Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). For criticism see, e.g., Clark, C.J., in
Collins v. American Automobile Insurance Co. of St. Louis, 230 F2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1956). See also Annot., 21 A.L.R. 2d 247 (1952).
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tion of sister state judgments,12 such new needs have been met by
new constitutional controls.13 Policies developing such controls are
obviously fundamentally different from those which continue to
determine international conflicts, 14 a fact signally apparent in the
12. Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813), per Story, J. As
to the present relations between the two conflicts laws in this respect, compare
Reese, The Statts ti this Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 Colum.
L. Rev. 783 (1950), and Nadelmann, supra note 8, with Reese and Johnson,
The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 153
(1949) , Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Equity Decrees, 42 Iowa L.
Rev. 183 (1957). Compare also Ehrenzweig, Recognition of Custody Decrees
Rendered Abroad, 2 Am. J. Comp. L. 167 (1953) with Ehrenzweig, Interstate
Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 345 (1953).
13. See, e.g., Cheatham, supra note 11, Smith, The Constitution and the
Conflict of Laws, 27 Geo. L. J. 536 (1939) The selection by the Supreme
Court, in promoting this control, of a theory of full faith and credit to statutes
(see, e.g., Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of Public
Policy, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 339 (1952)) seems less than fortunate. In the first
place such language, which is probably due to an international conflicts liert-
tage (stressing respect to the decrees of foreign sovereigns), fails to disclose
the fact that such faith and credit requires "a full-fledged system of conflict of
laws" (Rheinstem, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 775, 788 (1955)), as to which statutes should not be treated differently
from common law rules. Cf. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer s
Clause of the Constitution, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1945). Secondly, and most
important, this terminology has prevented the Court from disclosing and
analyzing the choice of law rule it has impliedly recognized. If an action based
on a wrongful death statute of a sister state must be entertained (Hughes v.
Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951)) we shall have to know whether it is the statute
of the state where the wrongful conduct was committed, or where the injury
was inflicted, or where death occurred. We have not learned this so far. We
may hope that the Court, if following its present approach, will choose to
make clear that all it has done and probably can do, as it could and did (o
under due process, is to establish a set of minimum rules of choice of law
designed to exclude application of the le.r fori where justified expectations
require such exclusion.
14. Only "in the absence of proof to the contrary" should it be assumed
that such control will result in "a greater degree of comity, and friendship,
and kindness" toward a sister state. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) 519, 590 (1839). See also Bond v. Hume, 243 U.S. 15, 22 (1917)
Foreign experience shows that interregional conflicts rules may be even less
rigid than international ones. See Ficker, Grundfragen des Deutschen Inter-
lokalen Rechts 7 (1952), Wengler, Prinzipienfragen des interzonalen Rechts
in Deutschland, 4 Neue Jur. Wochenschrift 49 (1951). In this country recogni-
tion (possibly prohibited by the due process clause for interstate relations) of
the "international" competency of a foreign judgment court lacking jurisdic-
tion under its own law, may result in greater "kindness" to a foreign judgment
than that of a sister state. Pemberton v. Hughes, [1899] 1 Ch. 781, 790. See
also note 55 infra. While similar problems exist in some federations such as
Australia (cf. Cowen, The Conflict of Laws in Australia and the United
States, The Conflict of Laws and International Contracts, 174 (1949)) and
Germany (Ficker, supra), they have been largely eliminated in others. in-
eluding Canada, Mexico and Switzerland. See Eliesco. Essai stir lcs Con-
flits des Lois (1925) , Klein, Studien zum Interlokalen Privatrecht (1925)
Scrimali, I Conflitti Interregionali di Legge nel D.I.P (1925) , DeNova.
Les systntnes iuridiques complexes en droit international prive, Rev. Crit.
D.I.P 1 (1955), DeNova, Natura del D.I.P., 32 Riv. Dir. Int. (1940)
Niboyet, Conflits entre les lots francaises et les lois locales d'Alsace et
Lorraine en droit prive, Cominm. de la lot dit 24 Juillet 1921 (1922) See
also Guldener, Das Internationale und Interzonale Zivilprozessrecht ter
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near-general limitation to interstate conflicts, of current efforts for
uniform legislation in this field.15 Full faith and credit between sister
states would and should gain in a final divorce from the "comity"
between foreign nations.1"
Some of these policy differences have resulted in the develop-
ment m each field of large sectors which lack counterparts in the
other. Thus, problems prevailingly occupying the courts in interstate
relations, such as those concerning the constitutional "jurisdiction"
of the judgment court, the applicability of foreign wrongful death
statutes, or the manifold problems arising from different statutes of
limitations17 and workmen's compensation,"' are comparatively rare
Schweiz (1951), Kollejwin, Ned. Tijdschr. Int. R. 269 (1953), Lalive,
Schweiz. Beatr. zum 4. int. Kong. ffir Rechtsvergl. 103 (1954), Lampue, Rev.
Crit. D.LP 249 (1954), Beitzke, Droit international pnvi et Droit inter-
regwnal prvi, 8 Rev. Hell de Droit Int. 131 (1955), Schoch, Confl lh of
Laws ti a Federal State: The Experzence of Swit~crland, 55 Harv. L. Rev.
738 (1942). For further references and comparative analysis, see Batiffol
Droit International Pnvi 302 (2d ed. 1955).
15. See, e.g., the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support, Divorce
Recognition, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Interstate Arbitration of
Death Taxes, Interstate Compromise of Death Taxes Acts, U.L.A. vols. 9 and
9a. For an example of state legislation to the same effect, see N.Y. Decedent
Estate Law, § 160, limiting the recognition of foreign administrators ex-
pressly to those appointed in the United States. See Gibb v. Chisholm, 204
Misc. 892, 126 N.Y.S.2d 150 (Sup. Ct 1953).
16. "The misleading word 'comity' has been responsible for much of the
trouble." See Cardozo, J., Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120
N.E. 198, 201 (1918).
17 In most of the few cases involving international conflicts, such as
Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., Ltd., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955) (Pana-
ma), Goodwin v. Townsend, 97 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1952) (Ontario), Wood
& Selick, Inc. v.- Compagnme Generale Transatlantique, 43 F 2d 941 (2d
Cir. 1930) (France) (see also Wheeler v. Soc. Nat. des Chemins de Fer
Frangais, 108 F Supp. 652, 654 (1952)), Gonzales v. The Archangelos, 135
F Supp. 663 (E.D.Va. 1955) (Honduras), Sinai v. Levi, 208 Misc. 650, 144
N.Y.S2d 316 (1955) (Italy), the ler for in effect prevailed over the defense
of foreign limitation. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d,
720, 132 P.2d 70 (1942), cert. dented, 319 U.S. 774 (1943), is distin-
gnishable as applying Philippine law under a borrowing statute of the forum.
Insistence upon "procedural" characterization in interstate cases may be
abetted by the inclusion of foreign country limitations. Bank of Nova Scotia
v. San Mignel, 196 F2d 950, 956 (Ist Cir. 1952).
18. The following are some typical problems arising in the international
field, the constitutionality of statutory discrimination against nonresident
alien dependents (Antosz v. State Compensation Comm'r, 130 Wr Va. 260,
43 S.E.2d 397 (1947)), exclusiveness as to foreign accidents (Spelar v.
American Overseas Airlines, Inc., 80 F Supp. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1947)),
sufficiency of proof (Bass Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Christopoulos, 119 Ind.
App. 568, 88 N.E2d 692 (1949), Romano v. Littleton Constr. Co., 95 N.H.
404, 64 A.2d 695 (1949), Catelli v. Bayonne Associates, 3 N.J. Super. 122,
65 A2d 617 (1949)), the scope and impact of treaties (Liberato v. Royer,
270 U.S. 535 (1926), lannone v. Radory Construction Corporation. 285 App.
Div. 751, 1208, 141 N.Y.S2d 311 (1955), afftd, 1 N.Y2d 671, 150 N.Y.S.2d 199
(1956) (Italy), Micaz v. Compensation Comm'r, 123 WV a. 14, 13 S.E.2d 161
(1941)), and the treatment of alien enemy dependents (e.g., Todeva v. Oliver
Iron Mining Co., 232 Minn. 422, 45 N.W.2d /82 (1951)). See 2 Larson, The
Law of Workmen's Compensation § 63.52 (Supp. 1956).
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in international conflicts. On the other hand, problems such as those
relating to currency fluctuations,19 expropriations, or litigation by,
against or between aliens, 20 are virtually limited to international
transactions as are those arising in bankruptcy, antitrust or adinr-
alty where interstate conflicts are significantly reduced by a national
law, or those problems concerning negotiable instruments or the
transfer of stock where interstate conflicts are often avoided by un-
form legislation.
21
Insistence upon formulas general enough to serve both fields,
may have impeded, and may continue to impede, that patient and
"delicate weighing process"22 as to specific fact situations which
alone can, it is believed, produce that degree of rationality and pre-
dictability which is indispensable if we are ever to attain a truly
national conflicts law 23 It may very well be, for instance, that lack
of a careful distinction between the two fields is at least partly re-
sponsible for the progressive dedication to a defeatist "proper law"
approach.24 And it may well be that many a leading opinion ren-
dered in cases involving international conflicts would, if in terms
limited to such conflicts, have avoided applications in the interstate
field which have proved anything but satisfactory
In Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp 25 we find the court refusing
to apply the owners' strict liability statute of Ontario to an Ontario
accident of a New York sales agent because of the absence of proof
19. Cf. In re James' Will, 248 N.Y. 1, 161 N.E. 201 (1928), Reese,
The Status ti this Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 Cohnm. L.
Rev. 783, 798 (1950) (discharge by payment in devaluated French currency).
20. In contrast to aliens, citizens of sister states are protected against
discrimination. Cf. Cheatham and Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52
Colum. L. Rev. 959, 963 (1952). Conceivably common treatment of aliens and
residents of sister states has contributed to the preservation of the few re-
maining distinctions for conflicts purposes between residents and nonresidents
among American citizens. Cf. Douglas v. New York N.H. & H.R. Co., 279
U.S. 377 (1929) (holding such discriminations constitutional) , Canadian
Northern R. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920) , Reese and Green, That
Elusive Word, "Residence," 6 Vand. L. Rev. 561 (1953).
21. See Stumberg, Commercial Paper and the Conflict of Laws, 6 Vaid.
L. Rev. 489 (1953)
22. Cheatham and Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 Colum. L.
Rev. 959, 982 (1952).
23. Cheatham, A Federal Nation and Conflict of Laws, 22 Rocky Mt.
L. Rev. 109 (1950)
24. It may not have been a coincidence that the New York Court of
Appeals in the now leading case of Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d
99 (1954), adopted this approach for the law of contracts in an international
conflicts case. Failure to distinguish between the manifold problem situations
in interstate cases may also account for "proper law" trends in the law of
torts. Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 881 (1951). But
see Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting ti Intentional Multistate Torts, 36
Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1951), and Prosser, Interstate Publication. 51 Mich. L.
Rev. 959 (1953).
25. 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934)
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that the owner had authorized the entry of the car into Ontario. A
leading text doubts "the correctness of the result,"2 6 though appar-
ently adopting it as hornbook law for both international and inter-
state cases. Might not the answer be that the holding should have
been limited to the statute of a foreign country? In Louws-Dreyfus
v. Paterson S. S.,2 ' Judge Learned Hand excused a Canadian carrier
under a Canadian statute from a negligence claim that would have
obtained under the law of Minnesota, the place of contracting. His
statement that the law of the place of performance also determines
"any excuses of nonperformance," has apparently been adopted in
the Restatement,2 s thus rendering the general rule, that the place of
contracting governs, an empty shell..2 9 Would Judge Hand have
been equally intent on applying the foreign law had performance
occurred in another state of the union? It is often overlooked that
the "homeward trend"3 0 may be prompted not only by greater
strangeness but also by greater similarity between forum and for-
eign law.
NEED FOR AN INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS LAw
Parallel and contributory to a possible divergence between the
laws of international and interstate conflicts is the fact that the treat-
ment of the former, both as to scope and merits, may not only differ
from that of interstate conflicts, but even as to each foreign country
involved.31 Obviously the law of an adjoining Canadian province
will find different treatment in a Michigan or New York court than
that of far distant Saudi Arabia.3 2
This difficulty is enhanced by the fact that American courts, not-
withstanding a legislative trend to the contrary,33 will usually re-
quire the law of a foreign country to be pleaded and proved. Failure
to comply with tis requirement (now largely abandoned as between
26' Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 279 (3d ed. 1949).
27. 43 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1930).
28. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 358 (1934).
29. Nussbaum, Principles of Private International Law 174 (1943).
30. Id. at 37
31. Recognition of this fact accounts for the current publication of
bilateral studies by the Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law at
Columbia University. Cf. the studies of Delaume (France), Doinke (Ger-
many), Eder (Columbia), Ehrenzweig-Fragistas-Yiannopoulos (Greece),
Kolleroijn (Netherlands), Nussbaum (Switzerland), Philip (Denmark).
32. See Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956), infra note 35.
33. See, e.g., New York Civil Practice Act, § 344-a, Nussbaum, The
Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 Yale L.J. 1018 (1941), Sommerich and
Busch, The Expert Witness and the Proof of Foreign Law, 38 Corn. L.Q.
125 (1953), Nussbaum, Proof of Foreign Law ti New York: A Proposed
Amendment, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 348 (1957), 23 A.L.R. 2d 1437 (1952).
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sister states) 34 will in international cases frequently induce the Ainer-
ican court to apply its own law, and this quite generally and not only
where the foreign country has "no law that civilized countries would
recognize as adequate."3 5 In fact, the court may even choose to dis-
miss the complaint without reference to any law, as in a recent case
where the plaintiff had failed to prove Saudi Arabian law, the law
of "the place of wrong."36 Whether that law was necessarily applica-
ble in an international conflicts case, was not considered although
parties to both the accident and litigation were American citizens.
An independent international conflicts rule referring to the lex for;
could well have been predicated upon such a common citizenship in
the forum rather than upon the purely fortuitous place of the acci-
dent, 7 and could thus have avoided what the court itself considered
a denial of justice.3s
There are many other concepts developed by courts primarily to
suit the exigencies of interstate relations that may unecessarily bur-
den international conflicts law Thus, early stress in this country
upon domicile in preference to nationality, prevailing elsewhere as
a basic element of choice of law,39 may have been indispensable to
take account of an ever-increasing mobility from state to state. But
it may well be that an international conflicts law freed from its inter-
state background would tend toward a different solution.4 0 More-
over, by a separate treatment of international conflicts it might be-
come possible to solve the perennial problem in this field of whether
34. See Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, 9 U.L.A. 401(1951, Supp. 1956).
35. Although lacking authority, such a rule would apparently be
recognized in the Second Circuit [Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., 233
F.2d 541,545 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. demed, 352 U.S. 872 (1956)] on the strength
of a dictum in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-56(1909).
36. Walton v Arabian American Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956),
cert. dented, 352 U.S. 872 (1956). See also Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co.,
48 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1931), McQuade v. Compania d Vapores, 131
F Supp. 365, 367 (S.D. N.Y. 1955).
37 But cf. Cuba Railroad Co. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912), in effect
dismissing the complaint of a presumably American workman against a
Cuban railroad for damages for a work accident in Cuba. Not only was the
defendant a foreign corporation, but the court stressed that here the parties
had entered "into civil relations in foreign jurisdictions" without reliance
on American courts. Id. at 480.
38. Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541, 545, 546 (2d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956) See also Leary v. Gledhill. 8 N.J.
260, 84 A.2d 725 (1951) Schumann v. Loew's, Inc., 135 N.Y.S.2d 361. 3o6
(Sup. Ct. 1954) , 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 377, 382 (1957)
39. 1 Rabel, Conflict of Laws 101, 112 (1945).
40. Id. at 149. The Polish law of 1926 distinguishes between interna-
tional and interstate conflicts in this respect. Makarov, Quellen dies Iiter-
nationalen Privatrechts (1953), title "Poland."
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capacity should be governed by the law of the place of contracting
or by the law of domicile. In interstate conflicts the former has
usually been given preference," as in such cases "resort to domicile
is impracticable, because of the uncertainties connected with
domicile. It may appear, however, that the domicile of persons en-
gaged in international trade is more stable than the domicile in the
average case where interstate transactions are involved, and if that
assumption is justified, domicile may furnish a convenient standard
for international transactions. In fact, it might be possible to regard
the place in which the business is carried on, that is, the business resi-
dence, as a substitute for domicile in determining capacity in this
class of cases."
4 -2
We may admire as "inspiring" the "spectacle of foreign coun-
tries being granted all the privileges of sister states.' 3 But it has
not been privileges alone that have been "granted" to foreign coun-
tries by our private international law. In Boiwn v. Talcott," an Ohio
federal court denied recognition to a Quebec judgment against an
Ohio motorist, service upon whom had been made by publication as
required by Quebec law, and by mail by discretionary order of the
Quebec court. Although the defendant had thus actually been noti-
fied, a violation of due process was seen in the fact that the Quebec
statute did not comply with the standard established by the Supreme
Court for American legislation of this kind.4'5 This holding of the
Ohio court can be justified on the ground, stated in an earlier case,
that it is "unreasonable that we should give greater respect to judg-
ments recovered in a foreign country than to a judgment recovered
in on of our sister states.' 46 The true issue seems to be, however,
whether constitutional standards established by and for American
courts and conditioned upon the peculiar history and functions of
American concepts of jurisdiction,' 7 should be applied in judging
the propriety of procedures in courts of foreign countries based upon
41. See m general Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 241-42 (2d ed. 1951).
42. Lorenzen, Uniformity between Latin America and the Unitcd States
in the Rules of Prvate International Law Relating to Commercial Con-
tracts, 15 Tul. L. Rev. 165, 170 (1941), accord, Batiffol, Form and Capacity
m International Contracts, The Conflict of Laws and International Contracts
103, 111 (1949). See also Beale, The Law of Capacity in International Mar-
riages, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 382 (1902).
43. Du Bois, The Significance in Conflict of Laws of the Distinction
between Interstate and International Transactions, 17 Minn. L. Rev. 361,
362, 380 (1933).
44. 102 F Supp. 979 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
45. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
46. Grubel v. Nassaner, 210 N.Y. 149, 103 N.E. 1113 (1913).
47 See Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The
"Power" Myth and Forum Convenmens, 65 Yale L.J. 289 (1956).
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equally ancient and fair standards of competency and notice. 48 Sim-
ilar considerations apply to the unfortunate general denial of merger
of causes of action in foreign country judgments, 4 more likely than
not due to the lack of an independent international standard linked
to the enforceability of judgments from the particular foreign coun-
try 50
An independent international conflicts law might very well have
succeeded in this and other respects, in developing its own stand-
ards, more liberal than those in effect adopted in applying inappro-
priate interstate conceptions. Thus, without the background of full
faith and credit, American courts might have long ago decided to
follow the example of New York in recognizing divorces obtained
in foreign countries upon tests better adapted to international rela-
tions than the domicile test serving the typical exigencies of inter-
state relations, they might have developed a new test in applying
the no-double-liability exception in the taking of quasi in rem juris-
48. See Pope v. Heckscher, 266 N.Y. 114, 194 N.E. 53 (1934) (Cana-
dian judgment based upon service by mail) , Grubel v. Nassauer, 210 N.Y. 149,
103 N.E. 1113 (1913) (German judgment without personal service) , Smith v.
Grady, 68 Wis. 215, 31 N.W 477 (1887) (Canadian judgment based upon per-
sonal service in Wisconsin). "Such conformity [between American and foreigi
standards] is not demanded in private international law by wich the obliga-
tion created by a foreign judgment should properly be tested." 48 Harv. L.
Rev. 680 (1935). Cf. Northern Aluminum Co. v. Law, 157 Md. 641, 147 Atl.
715 1929), recognizing a Canadian judgment complying with Canadian law,
by virtue of defendant's Canadian citizenship. See Note, 27 Harv. L. Rev.
464 (1914) On the different functions of Anglo-American "jurisdiction"
and civilian "competence," see Nussbaum, Principles of Private International
Law § 20 (1943). As to the latter, see, e.g., Austrian "Jurisdiktionsnorm."
§ 99; Danish Lov om Rettenspleje, § 248, German Code Civ. Proc., § 23,
Scotland, e.g., North v. Stewart, 15 A.C. 452 [1890] , Swedish Riittegangs
balk (1948) c. 10, § 1. See Beale, The Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners,
26 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 199 (1913) , Ross, The Shifting Basis of Jurisdiction,
17 Minn. L. Rev. 146 (1933), probably the most perceptive analysis of the
problem. Perhaps it should give us pause that a highest court of a continental
country recently denied recognition to a Nevada divorce, holding the notice
requirements of in rem jurisdiction prevailing in this country, to be contra
bonos mores. H, nee K. divorced S. v. Austrian Federal Ministry of Justice,
Adm. Court of Austria, April 1, 1954, 4 Am. J. Comp. L. 245 (1955)
49. Swift v. David, 181 Fed. 828 (9th Cir. 1910), New York, L.E. &
W.R. Co. v. McHenry, 17 Fed. 414 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883), Eastern Town-
ships Bank v. H. S. Beebe & Co., 53 Vt. 177, 38 Am. Rep. 665 (1880) , The
East, 8 Fed. Cas. 265 (N.D.N.Y. 1877) See Pirsig, Merger by Judgment, 28
Minn. L. Rev. 419 (1944) , Developments ti the Law--Res Judicata, 65 Harv.
L. Rev. 818 (1952)
50. Where the plaintiff can expect recognition of his judgment, there is
no reason for permitting him to sue on his original cause of action "If the
foreign judgment is conclusive upon the merits against the defendant, why
is it not equally so against the plaintiff ?" Alaska Commercial Co. v. Debney
2 Alaska 303, 312 (1904). Common treatment of international and interstate
problems of res judicata should be precluded by the fundamentally different
structure of this doctrine in the common law and civil law orbit. Millar, The
Premises of the Judgment as Res Judicata ti Continental and Anglo-Amer-
can Law, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 238 (1940)
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diction ;51 they mght have been willing to give some effect to foreign
status conceptions unknown to the laws of the sister states,52 as they
have given effect to the civil law classification of things movable and
immovable, 53 or to the procedural capacity of foreign heirs whose
status differs so fundamentally from that of American personal rep-
resentatives ;54 and they might have further extended, rather than
discredited, earlier attempts at establishing an international mini-
mum standard of choice of law which in some cases may well be
more rigid than in interstate conflicts. 55
Moreover, interstate conflicts rules, whether or not adopted un-
der constitutional compulsion, are largely dictated by the need for
curtailing that "forum shopping" for the more advantageous law,
which is invited by the prevailing "transient rule" of personal juris-
diction.5 6 Since this consideration has little meaning in international
conflicts, it may often be too much to ask from American courts, to
apply interstate rules to international conflicts. This demand may
well have contributed to all-too-willing resort to the lex fort in cases
51. Compare Parker, Peebles & Kno, Inc. v. National Fire Ins. Co.,
111 Conn. 383, 150 At. 313 (1930), Weitzel v. Weitzel, 27 Arm 117,
230 Pac. 1106 (1924) (demal of jurisdiction over nonresident aliens based on
garmshment and constructive service) with Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215
(1905) (assumption of such jurisdiction man interstate case involving full faith
and credit). See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 181 (3d ed. 1949) , 40 Yale L.J.
139 (1930) , Annot., 69 A.L.R. 609 (1930).
52. But see, Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 120 (1934). There seems
to be little justification for an American court's refusal to recognize such
legal relations as those created by the French "prodigality" concept (cf. In re
Weil, 63 J. du Dr. Int. (Clunet) 893 (1936)) or a foreign polygamous mar-
riage between foreigners (cf. Estate of Bir, 83 Cal. App. 2d 256, 188 P.2d
499 (1948)).
53. See Toledo Soc. for Crippled Children v. Hickok, 152 Tex. 578, 261
S.W.2d 692 (1953), cert. dented, 347 U.S. 936 (1954).
54. Compare In re Prevost's Estate, 138 N.Y.S2d 828 (Surr. Ct. 1955),
Gibb v. Chisholm, 204 Misc. 892, 126 N.Y.S.2d 150 (Sup. Ct 1953) with
Vanquelin v. Bouard, 15 C.B. (N.S.) 341 (C.P. 1863), Sultan of Turkey v.
Tiryakian, 213 N.Y. 429, 108 N.E. 72 (1915), In re Zietz' Estates, 207 Misc.
22, 135 N.Y.S.2d 573, 579 (Surr. 1954), aff'd, 285 App. Div. 1147, 143 N.Y.S.
2d 602 (1955), affd 1 N.Y.2d 748, 135 N.E.2d 49 (1956). Concerning the
differences in this respect between the two great legal systems, see Rhemstein,
European Metlds for the Liquidation of the Debts of Deceased Persons, 20
Iowa L. Rev. 431 (1935). As to Louisiana law, see 27 Tul. L. Rev. 87 (1952).
For an analysis of both German and American problems in this field see
Raape, Internationales Privatrecht (4th ed. 1955) 418.
55. Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), wvhich subjected
to the due process requirement a Texas court's obligation to refrain from
applying the lex fori to a Mexican contract. This case seems to be injeopardy in view of what appears as a lack of respect given to the decision in
the interstate case of Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348
U.S. 66 (1954). See supra note 11. But see Restatement Second, Conflict of
laws, Tent Draft No. 3, 20 (1956), Batiffol, La Cour supr~ne des Atats-
Urns et le Droit International Priv6, [1936] Rev. Crit. Dr. Int. 597, 613
(1936).
56. Ehrenzweig, supra note 47
19571
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
involving such conflicts, either under traditional rules relating to
choice 57 or proof of foreign law,5 or by such ready tools as renvoi, 0
procedural characterization," or public policy 0" This tendency in
some fields may, notwithstanding orthodox court language to the
contrary, have resulted in new rules for international conflicts now
concealed by the current postulate identifying the rules governing
international and interstate conflicts. On the other hand, interna-
tional conflicts may have to retain restrictive rules gradually weak-
ening in interstate relations, as, for instance, in relation to the con-
cept of local actions.6 2
The identification of international and interstate conflicts rules
in theory, and the stress as to the former upon the lex fort, may also
have stifled the impact (so widely recognized in its American begin-
nings) of the general principles of public upon private international
57 In an unpublished dissertation (Berkeley, Cal., 1956) Dr. Yianno-
poulos found that in cases involving foreign wills as to movables, American
courts have in effect consistently applied the law of the American situs and
thus usually the lex Jort rather than the law of the testator's domicile. See
also the analysis of some of the bilateral studies in Ehrenzweig-Fragistas-
Yiannopoulos, op. cit. supra note 31, according to which American courts
in cases involving foreign countries have in effect preferred the foreign
law over their own only in every few exceptional cases. See also Hopkins, The
Extraterritorial Effect of Probate Decrees, 53 Yale L.J. 221, 222 (1944)
excluding from his analysis extranational probate decrees as preseiting "dis-
tinctive elements of both law and policy." For the practice presently prevail-
ing concerning statutes of limitations see supra note 17
58. See supra note 33.
59. See, e.g., Taormina v. Taormina Corp., 109 A.2d 400 (Del. Ch. 1954),
or the widely criticized case of In re Schneider's Estate, 96 N.Y.S. 2d 652
(Surr. Ct. 1950), aff'd on reargument, 100 N.Y.S.2d 371 (Surr. Ct. 1950) ,
cf. 50 Colum. L. Rev. 862 (1950), 64 Harv. L. Rev. 166 (1950).
60. See, e.g., Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. Robert Stewart & Sois, 336
U.S. 386 (1949). Leroux v. Brown, 12 C.B. 801 (1852), characterizing the
Statute of Frauds as procedural, is still authority in American interstate con-
flicts cases. Distinguishing this case as involving an international conflict
might help in clarifying an increasingly complex interstate problem. See
Comment, 43 Calif. L. Rev. 295 (1955). See also Cook, The Logical and Legal
Bases of Conflict of Laws 154 (1949).
61. See, e.g., De Brimont v. Penniman, 7 Fed. Cas. 309 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1873) , Bodenheimer, The Public Policy Exception li Private International
Law: a Reappraisal it the Light of Legal Philosophy, 12 Seminar 51 (1954) ,
Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Rereading Pro-
fessor Lorenzen's Essays, 56 Yale L.J. 1155 (1947) ;Katzenbach, Conflicts on
an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Clains and Tolerances in Interstate and
International Law, 65 Yale L.J. 1087 (1956), Neuner, Policy Considerations
in the Conflict of Laws, 20 Can. B. Rev. 479 (1942), Paulsen and Sovern,
"Public Policy" tn the Conflict of Laws, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 969 (1956) Oil
the ever declining function of this concept in interstate law, see, e.g., Goodrich,
Foreign Facts and Local Fancies, 25 Va. L. Rev. 26 (1938).
62. Cf. Reasor-Hill Corp. v. Harrison, 220 Ark. 521, 249 S.W.2d 994
(1952) discarding this concept in part on the ground that "one may have some
sympathy for this position in international disputes, but it has no persuasive
effect when the States are involved." Id. at 525, 249 S.W.2d at 996.
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law. 63 Thus, resistance to a greater exercise of the treaty power in
the conflicts field 4 could perhaps be reduced if interstate conflicts
law could be specifically exempted from its scope. Moreover, greater
concession to a federal law of conflicts, and, indeed, a possible res-
toration of a federal courts conflicts law in modification of the
Klaxon doctrine, 5 could perhaps be achieved by limiting this goal
to the law of international conflicts embodied in a new "federal field"
within Justice Sutherland's famous dictum postulating a supra-state
law in matters concerning international relations. 8
Finally, such separate treatment seems urgently needed for the
guidance of foreign lawyers to whom the Restatement, particularly
since its translation into French, has become the primary source of
American private international law.67 Exclusion of this law from the
Restatement Second, as contemplated by its reporter, and the result-
ing segregation of both fields would greatly contribute to a sounder
development of American conflicts law.
63. See Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part oJ the National Law
of the United States, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 26, 792 (1952-53), Katzenbach,
Conflicts on an Unruly Horse, 65 Yale L.J. 1087, 1128 (1956), Stevenson,
The Relationship of Private International Law to Public Intentaional Law,
52 Colum. L. Rev. 561 (1952).
64. See supra note 10.
65. See supra note 11.
66. Ibid.
67. See Eder, El estudio del derecho Anglo-Americano, Cuadernos de
Derecho Angloamencano 33, 40 (1953), Ehrenzweig, El Restatement Ameri-
cano del Conflicto de Derechos: Historia de un Fracaso 37, 38 (1954),
Ehrenzweig, Bol. Inst. Der. Comp. de Mex. 258 (1952), Goodrich, The
American Law Institute, Report for 25th Annual Meeting 7 (1948),
Ehrenzweig, Zini Handwerkszeug des amerikantschen intertatlionalen
Przvatreehts, 7 Oesterreichische Zeitschrift ffir 6ffentliches Recht 521 (1956).
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